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AN ANALYSIS OF THE RULE 11 
SANCTION: ANDERSON V. BEATRICE'S 
"THIRTEENTH CHIME OF THE CLOCK" 
Anthony D'Imperio* 
Some circumstantial evidence is very strong, as when you find a trout 
in the milk. 
-Henry David Thoreau! 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Many are familiar with the sad story of eight families in the small 
city of Woburn, Massachusetts, portrayed by Jonathan Harr in his 
compelling book A Civil Action.2 It is the true story of Anderson v. 
Beatrice, a lawsuit originally filed in 1982 on behalf of these families, 
claiming that Beatrice Foods (Beatrice) and W.R. Grace (Grace) used 
and disposed of industrial solvents on their properties, and polluted 
the Woburn water supply.3 Such pollution, the plaintiffs asserted, 
caused family members to suffer leukemia and other serious health 
problems:4 After three and one-half years of discovery, the case was 
tried in federal court on the limited issue of whether Grace and 
Beatrice contaminated two municipal water wells.5 The jury exoner-
* Production Editor, Articles Editor, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW 
REVIEW, 1997-1998. The author thanks Jan Schlichtmann for his valuable comments regarding 
the case, Jonathan Harr, for lending his comprehensive collection of trial transcripts and docu-
ments, and Professor Zygmunt J.B. Plater for his guidance throughout the process. The opinions 
in this Comment are those of the author alone. 
1 HENRY DAVID THOREAU, JOURNAL, Nov. 11, 1854 (1906). 
2 See generally JONATHAN HARR, A CIVIL ACTION (1995). Citations in this Comment are to 
the hardcover edition. 
3 See Anderson v. W.R. Grace & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1219, 1222 (D. Mass. 1986). The plaintiffs 
joined another company, Unifirst, to the suit in 1985, but they settled with Unifirst before the 
trial. See HARR, supra note 2, at 146. 
4 See Anderson, 628 F. Supp. at 1222. 
5 See Anderson v. Beatrice Foods Co., 862 F.2d 910, 914-15 (1st Cir. 1988). The narrow focus 
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ated Beatrice of liability but found Grace negligent in disposing of 
chemicals on its property.6 Two months later, before a second proceed-
ing could resolve issues of causation and damages, the judge ruled 
that the jury had misunderstood the evidence implicating Grace, and 
ordered a new trial.7 The plaintiffs then settled with Grace for $8 
million.8 Subsequently, the plaintiffs appealed the Beatrice verdict.9 
During the pendency of the appeal, plaintiffs learned of certain evi-
dence that had not been produced by the defendants during discov-
ery.JO This series of post-trial revelations provides the backdrop for 
this Comment's examination of the court's ultimate Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 11 (Rule 11) sanction against the plaintiffs. 
Rule 11 played an important role in this long and complicated trial. 
Essentially, Rule 11 provides for the sanctioning of attorneys who do 
not perform reasonable legal and factual inquiries before they file 
legal papers, or file the papers for an improper purposeY Its aim is 
to deter frivolous claims and thus streamline the litigation process in 
federal courtS.12 The rule was invoked twice during the Anderson 
litigation, at the beginning of the case and at its end.13 This Comment 
focuses analysis on the latter Rule 11 finding. It argues that the Rule 
11 sanction in Anderson was inappropriate, given the evidence the 
plaintiffs gathered pursuant to pre-trial and post-trial proceedings, 
the fact that defendants withheld probative information, and the lack 
of due process afforded plaintiffs. Although Anderson was a very 
fact-specific, enigmatic case, and Rule 11 has been amended since the 
trial, the Anderson courts' treatment of Rule 11 remains important 
of this Comment, and the inability of its author to tell as good a story as Mr. Harr, preclude a 
colorful description of the real-life courtroom drama that took place. The main individuals that 
will be referred to throughout this Comment are Jan Schlichtmann, the plaintiffs' attorney; 
Jerome Facher, lead counsel for Beatrice; and Walter Skinner, the federal district court judge 
who heard the case. See id. at 910, 915. 
6 See id. at 914-15. 
7 See id. at 915 n.2. 
8 See HARR, supra note 2, at 451. 
9 See Anderson, 862 F.2d at 915. 
10 See id. at 922. 
11 See FED. R. CIV. P. 11. 
12 See MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 11.03 (1997). 
13 See Anderson v. Beatrice Foods Co., 129 F.R.D. 394 (D. Mass 1989); Anderson v. Cryovac, 
Inc., 96 F.R.D. 431 (D. Mass. 1983). The first invocation of Rule 11 occurred in a motion by W.R. 
Grace to dismiss the complaint against it. See Anderson 96 F.R.D. at 431. Using the pre-1983 
Rule 11, Judge Skinner held that plaintiffs had the requisite good faith belief that Grace was 
responsible for contaminating the Woburn water. See id. at 432. This, he stated, "carries the 
plaintiff's complaint past the Rule 11 challenge." [d. 
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because the case has generated widespread public interest. This Com-
ment ultimately suggests that Rule 11 should not, as it was in Ander-
son, be strictly applied against plaintiffs in complex environmental 
lawsuits. 
II. CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE RULE 11 VIOLATION IN ANDERSON 
The series of events that led to the controversial invocation of Rule 
11 in Anderson began in 1987, more than a year after presiding federal 
district court judge Walter Skinner had entered judgment for Bea-
trice in the first phase of trial and while plaintiffs' attorney Jan 
Schlichtmann's appeal was pending.l4 During a routine search of the 
Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) Region I records, one of 
Schlichtmann's assistants discovered a groundwater analysis report 
prepared by Yankee Environmental Engineering and Research Serv-
ices (Yankee Report) for the J.J. Riley Tannery (tannery), which 
Beatrice owned, three years before the start of trial. l5 Schlichtmann 
was shocked because he had not seen this report before, even though 
he had asked several times through interrogatories, depositions, and 
subpoenas for all such documents. l6 Schlichtmann thought the Yankee 
Report was particularly relevant to the issue of groundwater contami-
nation of the city wells by toxins flowing from Beatrice's tannery: 
The report stated that groundwater from under the [Beatrice] 
tannery flowed to the east, toward the city wells, through very 
14 See Anderson, 862 F.2d at 914-15. The first phase of the trial focused on whether Beatrice 
had disposed of chemicals on a 15 acre tract (15 acres) near its tannery prior to the closing of 
the wells, and if so, whether the chemicals it dumped contributed to the contamination of the 
city wells. See id. The jury had returned a verdict in favor of Beatrice, finding insufficient 
evidence that any of the chemicals that John J. Riley (the chief operating officer of Beatrice's 
tannery) testified were used by the tannery, reached the municipal wells from the 15 acres. See 
id. Judge Skinner amended the verdict pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 49(a), and made a dispositive 
factual finding that plaintiffs had failed to show that groundwater containing any complaint 
chemicals had reached the wells from the 15 acres. See id. Judgment was entered for Beatrice 
and plaintiffs subsequently appealed. See id. 
15 See Anderson, 862 F.2d at 922; HARR, supra note 2, at 459-60. See also Robert F. Blomquist, 
Bottomless Pit: Toxic Trials, The American Legal Profession, and Popular Perceptions of the 
Law, 81 CORNELL L. R. 953, 972-73 (1996). 
16 See Anderson, 862 F.2d at 922, 927; see also Anderson v. Beatrice Foods Co., 129 F.R.D. 394, 
395 (D. Mass 1989); HARR, supra note 2, at 460; Blomquist, supra note 15, at 972. There were 
actually two related reports that were discovered, but since the court found the second report 
to be a "relatively insignificant variant on the first," the reports are referred to collectively as 
the "Yankee Report." Anderson, 129 F.R.D. at 395. Beatrice had submitted the reports to the 
EPA in December 1986, but had not produced them during discovery. See HARR, supra note 2, 
at45~0. 
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porous soil, exactly as Schlichtmann's expert, [George F.] Pinder, 
had predicted. Tannery waste, described in the report as "a black 
sludge resembling peat," had been dumped down the hillside lead-
ing to the fifteen acres.17 
Schlichtmann felt that if the defendants had produced this report 
before trial, the case against Beatrice would have been vastly differ-
ent.18 Not only did Schlichtmann feel that the report reinforced the 
testimony of all his own experts, but he believed that it could have 
led him to make other findings. 19 Consequently, Schlichtmann filed 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) motions for a new trial on the 
grounds of newly discovered evidence or, in the alternative, that the 
report had been improperly withheld during discovery under circum-
stances that constituted misconduct by Beatrice.20 
In his denying this motion, Judge Skinner found that the Yankee 
Report was "more favorable to [Beatrice] than otherwise, or at the 
most of neutral value .... "21 Accordingly, he found that the Yankee 
Report would probably not have affected the outcome of the trial.22 
Judge Skinner did agree with Schlichtmann, however, that the de-
fense should have provided the Yankee Report to Schlichtmann dur-
ing discovery.23 This "default," the judge found, resulted from a "lapse 
17 HARR, supra note 2, at 460; see also Blomquist, supra note 15, at 972-73. 
18 See HARR, supra note 2, at 460; see also Blomquist, supra note 15, at 973. 
19 See HARR, supra note 2, at 460; see also Blomquist, supra note 15, at 973. 
20 See Anderson, 862 F.2d at 915, 923-24 n.10; HARR, supra note 2, at 460~1; see also 
Blomquist, supra note 15, at 973. The plaintiffs' assertion that the Yankee Report constituted 
new evidence was filed under FED. R. Cry. P. 60(b)(2), and their claim that the report was 
improperly withheld during discovery under circumstances that constitute fraud or misrepre-
sentation was filed under FED. R. Cry. P. 60(b)(3). See Anderson, 862 F.2d at 923-24 n.10. The 
"newly discovered evidence" provision of Rule 60(b)(2) was aimed at correcting erroneous 
judgments resulting from the unobtainability of evidence. See id. Consequently, a party seeking 
a new trial under Rule 6O(b)(2) had to show that the missing evidence was "of such a material 
and controlling nature" that it would have actually changed the outcome at trial. See id. By 
contrast, Rule 60(b)(3) focused not on erroneous judgments per se, but on judgments which 
were unfairly obtained. See id. There, the standard was less stringent-the withheld material 
had to have substantially interfered with the aggrieved party's ability to prepare for trial, but 
need not have turned the tide at trial. See id. at 923-24. Judge Skinner denied both motions, 
but the plaintiffs only appealed the Rule 60(b)(3) issue. See Memorandum and Order on Plain-
tiffs' Motion for a New Trial, Anderson v. Beatrice Foods Co., 862 F.2d 910 (lst Cir. 1988) (No. 
82-1672-8) [hereinafter Memorandum and Order); see also Anderson, 862 F.2d at 923-24 n.9. 
21 Memorandum and Order, supra note 20, at 6. See also HARR, supra note 2, at 464; 
Blomquist, supra note 15, at 973. 
22 Memorandum and Order, supra note 20, at 6. See also HARR, supra note 2, at 464; 
Blomquist, supra note 15, at 973. 
23 Memorandum and Order, supra note 20, at 19. See also HARR, supra note 2, at 464; 
Blomquist, supra note 15, at 973. 
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in judgment" and not a "deliberate misrepresentation."24 Further-
more, Judge Skinner indicated that the plaintiffs were somewhat to 
blame for the defense's failure to provide the report because they 
initiated a "discovery frenzy" and insisted on "rushing" to tria1.26 
Schlichtmann appealed Judge Skinner's ruling on the effect of the 
Yankee Report to the United States Court of Appeals for the First 
Circuit (court of appeals), consolidating this with the appeal of Judge 
Skinner's findings in favor of Beatrice in the first phase of tria1.26 
Although the court of appeals affirmed Judge Skinner's findings on 
the jury verdict that no groundwater had reached the city wells from 
Beatrice's 15 acre tract,27 the court held, counter to Judge Skinner's 
Rule 60(b) decision, that "the record contain[ed] clear and convincing 
evidence" of Beatrice's discovery misconduct.28 The court of appeals 
indicated that Judge Skinner had "abused his discretion in this in-
stance," which was a mistake "compounded when he proceeded to 
make findings of fact [about the discovery dispute] on the very mat-
ters which inquiry could reasonably have been expected to illumi-
nate.''29 Consequently, the court of appeals directed Judge Skinner to 
carry on additional "aggressive inquiry" into the discovery miscon-
duct and make a report to the court of appeals, which kept jurisdic-
tion.30 
Over a period of two months, Judge Skinner "heard the testimony 
of twenty-six witnesses and received into evidence 236 exhibits total-
ing almost three thousand pages."31 In July 1989, Judge Skinner pro-
vided his opinion, wherein he cleared Jerome Facher, Beatrice's lead 
counsel, of any wrongdoing and determined the necessity of holding 
another set of misconduct hearings.32 In those follow-up hearings, 
24 Memorandum and Order, supra note 20, at 20. See also HARR, supra note 2, at 464; 
Blomquist, supra note 15, at 973. 
20 Memorandum and Order, supra note 20, at 20. See also HARR, supra note 2, at 464; 
Blomquist, supra note 15, at 973-74. 
26 See Anderson v. Beatrice Foods Co., 862 F.2d 910, 915 (1st Cir. 1988); HARR, supra note 2, 
at 465; Blomquist, supra note 15, at 974. 
27 See Andersan, 862 F.2d at 914-15. 
28 Andersan, 862 F.2d at 927. See also HARR, supra note 2, at 466; Blomquist, supra note 15, 
at 974. 
29 Anderson, 862 F.2d at 930. See also HARR, supra note 2, at 466; Blomquist, supra note 15, 
at 974. 
30 Andersan, 862 F.2d at 928 n.13, 932. See also HARR, supra note 2, at 466-ti7; Blomquist, 
supra note 15, at 974. 
31 HARR, supra note 2, at 477; see also Anderson v. Beatrice Foods Co., 129 F.R.D. 394, 396 
(D. Mass. 1989); Blomquist, supra note 15, at 974. 
32 See Anderson v. Beatrice Foods Co., 127 F.R.D. 1,2--3 (D. Mass. 1989); see also HARR, supra 
note 2, at 484; Blomquist, supra note 15, at 974-75. 
624 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 25:619 
Beatrice would have to prove that the misconduct of Mary Ryan, one 
of its affiliated attorneys, had not "substantially impaired" Schlicht-
mann's preparation of plaintiffs' case against the Beatrice tannery.33 
During this additional round of misconduct hearings, Facher tried 
to bring Schlichtmann to the stand to ask him whether Schlichtmann 
had been prohibited from building his case against Beatrice because 
Beatrice did not produce the Yankee Report.34 When Schlichtmann 
refused, Judge Skinner called for Schlichtmann's pre-trial investiga-
tive file in order to determine whether he had similar groundwater 
material-independent of the Yankee Report-about the Beatrice 
tannery property.35 Judge Skinner's report to the court of appeals 
concluded that Schlichtmann's investigative file, "a thorough and well-
documented inquirY,"36 contained "no support whatsoever for the 
claim of disposal of the complaint chemicals at the tannery site, or by 
the tannery on the 15 acres .... "37 Judge Skinner found that at the 
beginning of the case and through the entire trial and post-trial mis-
conduct hearings, Schlichtmann knew that there was no available 
evidence of Beatrice's disposal of complaint chemicals, either at the 
tannery site or on the 15 acres.38 
Judge Skinner concluded that Schlichtmann had violated Rule 11 
by prosecuting a baseless claim, indicating that this was clear miscon-
duct.39 The judge found, however, that Schlichtmann's misconduct was 
offset by the misconduct of Riley and his attorney in withholding the 
Yankee Report.4o Accordingly, Judge Skinner held that "[i]n the con-
voluted context of this case, it is my recommendation that neither 
33 Anderson, 127 F.R.D. at 6. See also HARR, supra note 2, at 483-84; Blomquist, supra note 
15, at 974-75. Ryan, the court found, knew about the Yankee Report and yet failed to produce 
it at a deposition in 1986 of Edward Foley, the keeper of the tannery's records. See Anderson, 
127 F.R.D. at 5. The court indicated that Ryan's "lack of candor and subsequent misdirection" 
led the plaintiffs to believe that the Yankee Report did not exist. Id. at 6. 
34 See HARR, supra note 2, at 484; Blomquist, supra note 15, at 975. 
35 See HARR, supra note 2, at 484-85; Blomquist, supra note 15, at 975. 
36 A'nderson, 129 F.R.D. at 399. See also HARR, supra note 2, at 487; Blomquist, supra note 
15, at 975. 
37 Anderson, 129 F.R.D. at 399. See also HARR, supra note 2, at 487; Blomquist, supra note 
15, at 975. 
38 See Anderson, 129 F.R.D. at 400. See also HARR, supra note 2, at 487; Blomquist, supra 
note 15, at 975. 
39 See Anderson, 129 F.R.D. at 403-04. See also HARR, supra note 2, at 487; Blomquist, supra 
note 15 at 975. 
40 See Anderson, 129 F.R.D. at 396, 403--D4. See also HARR, supra note 2, at 487; Blomquist, 
supra note 15 at 975. 
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party should profit through sanctions from the delinquency of the 
other, and that should be the sanction for both of them."41 
The court of appeals ordered supplementary briefing, entertained 
oral argument, and ultimately accepted all of Judge Skinner's recom-
mendations as "sound, well-substantiated, and free from observable 
legal error."42 The court of appeals applied a deferential abuse of 
discretion standard in reviewing Judge Skinner's Rule 11 sanction 
recommendation.43 It was proper, the court of appeals found, for Judge 
Skinner to have used his discretion to recommend Rule 11 sanctions 
against the plaintiffs for their pursuit of the claim against the tannery, 
and to use those sanctions to balance out the sanctions due plaintiffs 
for defendants' misconduct.44 Consequently, the court of appeals held 
that "[t]his long safari of a case may at last be brought to a conclu-
sion."45 
III. ISSUES RAISED BY THE RULE 11 SANCTION 
Judge Skinner's issuing of the Rule 11 sanction to the plaintiffs 
played a pivotal role in the ultimate outcome of the Anderson case. 
By using the Rule 11 sanction against the plaintiffs to counterbalance 
the misconduct of Beatrice in withholding the Yankee Report, Judge 
Skinner was able to support his finding that there had not been 
substantial interference with the plaintiffs' tannery case. At that 
point, Schlichtmann's hopes for a new trial against Beatrice were 
essentially defeated. The plaintiffs, as well as subsequent commenta-
tors, have found several aspects of Judge Skinner's Rule 11 sanction 
troubling.46 For instance, did Judge Skinner apply the Rule 11 stand-
ard appropriately? Was the judge fair in his determination that the 
41 Anderson, 129 F.R.D. at 404. See also HARR, supra note 2, at 486; Blomquist, supra note 
15, at 975-76. 
42 Anderson v. Beatrice Foods Co., 900 F.2d 388, 392-93 (1st Cir. 1990). See HARR, supra note 
2, at 487-88; Blomquist, supra note 15, at 976 n.127. 
43 See Anderson, 900 F.2d at 394. 
44 See id. 
45Id. at 396. 
46 See Brief for the Plaintiffs-Appellants In Response to the District Court's Final Report to 
the Court of Appeals Following Remand at 23, Anderson v. Beatrice Foods Co., 862 F.2d 910 
(lst Cir. 1988) (No. 88-1070) [hereinafter Brief]. Responding to Judge Skinner's finding of a Rule 
11 violation, plaintiffs' counsel wrote: 
Plaintiffs' proof [regarding tannery disposal of chemicals] was the subject of intense 
scrutiny during discovery, prior to trial, during trial, and on appeal. Now suddenly, out 
of the blue, the district court finds plaintiffs' conduct in pursuing their claims and 
unraveling Beatrice's subterfuge to be misconduct "about equal" to the subterfuge 
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plaintiffs possessed absolutely no evidence of disposal of the complaint 
chemicals by Beatrice? Furthermore, was it even proper to invoke 
Rule 11 at all, given that the defendants had withheld probative 
information? An analysis of the courts' opinions, parties' briefs, mis-
conduct hearing transcripts, and other documents reveals some an-
swers to these questions. First, however, it is useful to examine the 
text and policies behind the version of Rule 11 that was operative at 
the time of the Anderson trial. 
IV. THE 1983 RULE 11 
A. Policy 
The purpose of Rule 11 is to ensure the integrity of pleadings, 
motions, and other papers filed in federal courtY Its role is best 
understood in light of the liberal pleading practices adopted under the 
original Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.48 In 1938, the drafters of 
the Federal Rules implemented a simplified "notice pleading" sys-
tem.49 The Rules provide that except in limited circumstances, a 
pleading is adequate if it gives the adversary "fair notice of what the 
plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests."50 Notice 
pleading thus significantly eases a plaintiff's initial burden in filing a 
claim.51 Rule 11 is geared toward preventing the abuse of this relaxed 
pleading system.52 
As originally drafted in 1938, Rule 11 required an attorney to sign 
all pleadings filed with the court.53 The signature was to be a repre-
sentation of the attorney's belief that the lawsuit was not baseless.54 
itself. This finding by the district court is so unfounded and unjust that, like the 
proverbial thirteenth chime of the clock, it calls into question all that has gone before. 
Id. Likewise, Professor Burbank has referred to Judge Skinner's Rule 11 sanctioning as an 
"abuse of power," and stated, "Rule 11 comes into play twice in [the Anderson case] ... and on 
neither occasion is the rule's reputation enhanced. Stephen B. Burbank, The Good, the Bad, and 
the Ugly, 79 JUDICATURE 318, 320 (1996). Similarly, Professor Blomquist has described Judge 
Skinner's Rule 11 determination as "an unfair turning of the tables." Blomquist, supra note 15, 
at 975. 
47 See FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee's note. 
48 See Edward D. Cavanagh, Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: The Case 
Against Turning Back the Clock, 162 FED. RULES DECISIONS 383, 386 (1995) (citing FED. R. 
CIV. P. 11 advisory committee's note). 
49 See id. (citing CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 68 (5th ed.». 
&lId. 
5! See id. 
52 See Cavanagh, supra note 48, at 386. 
53 See MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 12, § 11App.101[1]. 
54 See Jeffrey Neal Cole, Rule 11 Now, 17 No.3 LITIG. 10, 10 (1991). 
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The rule required courts to use a subjective standard of whether the 
attorney at issue filed the lawsuit in good faith.55 The use of a subjec-
tive standard, however, resulted in inconsistent applications of the 
rule.56 Courts were also uncertain about what type of sanctions were 
appropriate under various circumstances and whether the same stan-
dard applied to the actual litigants or only to the attorneys.57 The 
result was confusion and the infrequent imposition of sanctions.58 
During the mid-1970s, many judges and commentators began to 
observe that the federal courts were encountering a "litigation explo-
sion."59 These judges and commentators indicated that lawyers and 
parties were filing many frivolous civil lawsuits.60 They maintained 
that "the Federal Rules, especially by providing for flexible pleading 
and open-ended discovery, permitted attorneys and parties to misuse, 
overuse, and abuse the litigation process."61 
Even though these assertions were not necessarily supported by 
solid data, the Advisory Committee and the Supreme Court proposed 
that Rule 11 be radically changed as one way of dealing with the 
apparent problems in the system.62 Congress approved of the changes, 
and the amendments to Rule 11 became effective in August, 1983.63 
B. The 1983 Amendments 
The overall effect of the 1983 version of Rule 11 was to impose a 
series of affirmative duties upon a person signing pleadings, motions, 
or other papers to be filed in court.64 The amended rule provided, in 
pertinent part: 
The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by 
the signer that the signer has read the pleading, motion, or other 
paper; that to the best of the signer's knowledge, information, and 
belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact 
and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the 
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is 
55 See id. 
56 See Maureen N. Armour, Practice Makes Perfect: Judicial Discretion and the 1993 Amend-
ments to Rule 11,24 HOFSTRA L. REV. 677, 694 (1996). 
57 See MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 12, § 11.03. 
58 See Cavanagh, supra note 48, at 387-88; Cole, supra note 54, at 10. 
59 See Carl Tobias, Environmental Litigation and Rule 11, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 429, 432 
(1992); Armour, supra note 56, at 689. 
60 See 'Thbias, supra note 59, at 432; Armour, supra note 56, at 689. 
61 'Thbias, supra note 59, at 432. 
62 See id. 
63 See id. 
64 FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee's note (1983) (amended 1993). 
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not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to 
cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litiga-
tion .... If a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in violation 
of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall 
impose upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or 
both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay 
to the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable ex-
penses incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or 
other paper, including a reasonable attorney's fee.65 
Under the 1983 amended rule, then, an attorney had four basic 
affirmative duties in filing legal papers: first, an attorney was required 
to read all documents before signing.66 Second, an attorney was re-
quired to certify that a reasonable inquiry into the facts of the situ-
ation had been made before filing the lawsuit.67 A third affirmative 
duty under the 1983 rule required an attorney to make a reasonable 
inquiry into the controlling legal authorities and to ascertain that the 
pleading was warranted by existing law or was a good faith argument 
for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.68 Finally, 
an attorney had to certify to the court that the pleading was not filed 
with an improper purpose.69 
One significant amendment to Rule 11 was the removal of the 
prerequisite that an attorney have willfulness or bad faith before 
being sanctioned.70 Instead, attorneys were to be held to an objective 
standard of reasonable inquiry into the facts and the law.71 Courts 
were to judge the reasonable inquiry under the circumstances of each 
particular case.72 This was a more demanding standard than before, 
and the Advisory Committee expected that courts would use the new 
version of the rule more often.73 At the same time, however, the 
65 FED. R. CIY. P. 11 (1983) (amended 1993). 
66 See id. 
67 See id. 
68 See id. 
69 See id. Examples of improper purposes include harassment, delay, and needless increase in 
litigation. See MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 12, § 11.11[8)[a). 
70 See FED. R. CIY. P. 11 advisory committee's note. 
71 See id. 
72 See id. The Committee indicated: 
[d. 
[W)hat constitutes a reasonable inquiry may depend on such factors as how much time 
for investigation was available to the signer; whether he had to rely on a client for 
information as to the facts underlying the pleading, motion, or other paper; whether 
the pleading, motion, or other paper was based on a plausible view of the law; or 
whether he depended on forwarding counselor another member of the bar. 
73 See id. 
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Committee cautioned that the amended rule was not intended to "chill 
an attorney's enthusiasm or creativity in pursuing factual or legal 
theories."74 Courts, the Committee warned, should avoid using the 
wisdom of hindsight and should instead analyze the signer's pre-filing 
inquiry by determining what was reasonable to believe at the time 
the pleading, motion or other paper was submitted.75 
Another important change made to Rule 11 by the 1983 amend-
ments was the shift from discretionary sanctions to mandatory sanc-
tions.76 If a court found a violation of the amended Rule 11, it was 
required to impose some type of sanction.77 Judges, however, retained 
discretion as to the type and amount of sanction.78 Further, the Com-
mittee made explicit the courts' authority to impose sanctions on their 
own, without a motion by one of the parties.79 This was appropriate, 
the Committee asserted, in order to "overcome the traditional reluc-
tance of courts to intervene unless requested by one of the parties."80 
The Committee felt that courts had an affirmative duty to help 
streamline the litigation process by lessening frivolous claims, and 
their inherent power to detect and punish for Rule 11 violations was 
an integral part of this responsibility.8! 
The Advisory Committee also stressed that any sanctioning proce-
dure under Rule 11 had to comport with due process requirements.82 
It indicated, for example, that a party seeking sanctions should give 
notice to the court and the offending party promptly upon discovering 
a basis for doing so.&'l The Committee gave courts considerable discre-
tion, though, indicating that the particular format to be followed 
should "depend on the circumstances of the situation, and the severity 
of the sanction under consideration."84 
741d. 
75 See FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee's note. 
76 See MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 12, § 11.03. 
77 See id. 
78 See FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee's note. The Committee stated, "The court ... 
retains the necessary flexibility to deal appropriately with violations of the rule. It has discretion 
to tailor sanctions to the particular facts of the case, with which it should be well acquainted." 
ld. One form of sanction-payment of the opposing party's reasonable expenses and attorneys' 
fees-was expressly permitted, but not required. See id. 
79 See id. 
8°ld. 
8! See FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee's note. 
82 See id. 
83 See id. 
84 See id. 
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C. First Circuit Rule 11 Case Law at the Time of Anderson 
In applying Rule 11, district courts in the First Circuit took the 
Advisory Committee's admonitions to heart, and sought to balance 
the need to "deter dilatory and abusive tactics in litigation" against 
the danger of chilling an attorney's enthusiasm, creativity in pursuing 
factual or legal theories, or zealous advocacy.85 To this end, First 
Circuit district courts exercised caution in measuring an attorney's 
conduct under Rule 11, and evaluated an attorney's conduct based 
upon what was reasonable at the time the attorney acted.86 
Some cases, the courts found, presented special circumstances that 
weighed against a stringent application of Rule 11.87 For instance, if 
an attorney was understaffed or lacking resources, such as a solo 
85 Cruz v. Savage, 896 F.2d 626, 630-31, 634 (1st Cir. 1990) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory 
committee's note). 
86 See id.; see also Kalman v. Berlyn Corp., 706 F. Supp. 970, 980 (D. Mass. 1989) ("[H]indsight 
is an inadequate basis for Rule 11 sanctions."). 
87 See, e.g., Kale v. Combined Ins. Co. of Am., 861 F.2d 746 (1st Cir. 1988); Fudge v. Penthouse 
Int'l, Ltd., 840 F.2d 1012 (1st Cir. 1988); Muthig v. Brant Point Nantucket, Inc., 838 F.2d 600 (1st 
Cir. 1988). In Kale, the First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's finding that 
the plaintiff did not violate Rule 11 in bringing an Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
lawsuit. See Kale, 861 F.2d at 749. The court stated that although it did not find the plaintiffs 
argument for equitable tolling of the statute of limitations convincing, the lack of First Circuit 
precedent on point allowed the plaintiff great leeway to argue that the court should have taken 
a more liberal view of the equitable tolling issue than had other courts. See id. at 758. The court 
also found that Rule 11 sanctions should not be imposed on claims that are difficult to establish 
except through discovery. See id. at 75~. To do so would run the risk of chilling advocacy. 
See id. 
In Fudge, the First Circuit affirmed the district court's finding that plaintiffs did not violate 
Rule 11, where plaintiffs alleged that a men's magazine portrayed them in a false light and 
constituted intentional infliction of emotional distress. See Fudge, 840 F.2d at 1014. Although 
the district court dismissed all three of the plaintiffs' claims, it did not find that these claims 
were so objectively unsound as to warrant sanctions under Rule 11. See id. at 1021. There, the 
application of the doctrine of constitutionally-protected opinion was not clear-cut, and the state 
law covering false light and intentional infliction claims was not yet well-settled. See id. at 1022. 
To find a violation of Rule 11 in such a case, the court implicitly found, would risk chilling the 
enthusiasm of plaintiffs pursuing such claims, and would confuse plaintiffs' ability to ultimately 
prove their claims with plaintiffs' having a sufficient basis to bring the claims. See id. 
By contrast, in Muthig, the First Circuit upheld a finding of a Rule 11 violation where the 
plaintiffs' claims against the defendant for intentional infliction of emotional distress and fraud 
were "unjustified" and plainly "devoid of merit." See Muthig, 838 F.2d at 601. There, the court 
did not find any special factor, such as lack of resources, that would weigh against a strict 
application of Rule 11. See id. at 605. Rather, the plaintiffs' counsel was "associated with a major 
law firm with all the attendant resources." [d. The record made it clear that counsel should have 
known the factual inadequacy of the plaintiffs' claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
See id. The court found that it was a case of "invalid claims, the invalidity of which 'reasonable 
inquiry' would have revealed." [d. at 608. 
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practitioner, if an attorney were arguing for the establishment of 
new law, or if the existing laws were not yet clear or well-settled, 
First Cir-cuit district courts found that Rule 11 should not be applied 
strictly.88 Similarly, First Circuit district courts recognized the need 
to relax the application of the Rule 11 standard in cases where docu-
ments and materials would be difficult to obtain because they were in 
the opposing party's exclusive possession.89 It bears noting that at 
least three courts in other jurisdictions found that Rule 11 sanctions 
were not appropriate in the context of environmental or toxic tort 
litigation that was particularly complex or involved public health 
concerns.90 
First Circuit district courts also cautioned against judges evaluat-
ing whether a party's claim was weighty enough to survive a sum-
mary judgment or win at trial, in their determinations of whether 
Rule 11 sanctions were warranted.91 The dispositive issue was not 
whether the evidence was strong enough for the claim to survive a 
summary judgment motion, but whether the claim was "so objectively 
unsound as to warrant sanctions."92 An attorney's ability to ultimately 
win the case, courts implied, was not to be confused with his or her 
having a basis to pursue the claim.93 Finally, First Circuit courts 
88 See Muthig, 838 F.2d at 605, 609 (implying that Rule 11 should not be strictly applied in the 
case of "a litigating David matched against a defending Goliath"); Fudge 840 F.2d at 1022 (Rule 
11 not strictly applied where the law was not yet clear or well-settled); Kale, 861 F.2d at 758 
(Rule 11 not strictly applied where no precedent existed). 
89 See Kale, 861 F.2d at 760 n.16. 
90 See, e.g., In re 'Agent Orange' Prod. Liab. Litig., Lilley v. DQw Chern. Co., 611 F. Supp. 1267, 
1269 (E.D.N.Y. 1985). In that case, the court found that even though plaintiff's complaint had 
to be dismissed for lack of proof of causation between the product and plaintiff's disease, 
plaintiff's attorneys were not sanctionable under Rule 11. See id. at 1269. The importance of the 
Agent Orange litigation to veterans and to the public "argues strongly against denominating 
the complaint in this case frivolous and burdening counsel with Rule 11 sanctions." Id. The fact 
that plaintiff's attorneys discovered and revealed evidence that defendants' failed to take 
reasonable precautions in their use of Agent Orange, even absent proof of causation, was enough 
to satisfy Rule 11. See id.; see also Northwest Envtl. Defense Ctr. v. Unified Sewerage Agency 
of Washington County, 1989 WL 81608, *12 (D. Or. 1989) (Rule 11 sanction not appropriate in 
Clean Water Act citizen enforcement action against municipal corporation, where case involved 
"very complex" issues and allegations, and plaintiffs did not show bad faith or fail to conduct 
reasonable inquiry); International Union v. Amerace Corp., 20 Envtl. L. Rep. 20394, 20397 
(D. N.J. 1989) (Rule 11 sanction not appropriate in Federal Water Pollution Control Act citizen 
suit against metal finishing plant, that was dismissed, where there was not strong evidence of 
plaintiffs' bad faith, negligence or professional incompetence, and plaintiffs included organiza-
tions directed toward reducing human exposure to toxic and potentially hazardous substances). 
91 See Kale, 861 F.2d at 760. 
92 Id. 
98 See id.; see also Muthig, 838 F.2d at 606. 
632 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 25:619 
emphasized the need for Rule 11 sanctions to comport with the basic 
requirements of due process.94 
V. JUDGE SKINNER'S ApPLICATION OF RULE 11 
A. The 60(b)(3) Standard as Articulated by the Court of Appeals 
Judge Skinner's application of Rule 11 was interwoven with his 
application of the Rule 60(b)(3) standard set forth by the First Circuit 
Court of Appeals.95 It is helpful, then, to begin with an exploration of 
the latter rule. To reiterate, the court of appeals retained jurisdiction 
in the plaintiffs' Rule 60(b)(3) motion for a new trial on the grounds 
of misconduct and remanded the case to Judge Skinner for a special 
factual inquiry as to whether the defendants' nondisclosure of the 
Yankee Report had impaired the preparation of plaintiffs' tannery 
case.96 The court of appeals set guidelines for Judge Skinner to weigh 
the effect of nondisclosure of the report.97 Although it noted that "lack 
of access to any discoverable material forecloses 'full' preparation for 
trial," the court refined the standard, indicating that the nondisclo-
sure should "substantially" interfere with plaintiffs' ability "fully and 
fairly to prepare for and proceed at trial."98 The court of appeals 
indicated, however, that plaintiffs did not have to prove that the con-
cealed material would likely have "turned the tide at trial."99 Rather, 
substantial impairment could exist if plaintiffs showed that "the con-
cealment precluded inquiry into a plausible theory of liability, denied 
[them] access to evidence that could well have been probative on an 
important issue, or closed off a potentially fruitful avenue of direct or 
cross examination."loo 
In addition, the court of appeals asserted that where information is 
purposely withheld, such information may be presumed to have been 
damaging to the withholder, and to have obstructed the discovery of 
additional evidence adverse to the withholder.101 Thus, Judge Skinner 
94 See Muthig, 838 F.2d at 604, 606-07 (to conform to "due process protections contained in 
Rule 11 and in the Constitution," there must be "notice and opportunity to present arguments 
before imposition of Rule 11 sanctions"). 
95 See Anderson v. Beatrice Foods Co., 129 F.R.D. 394,401-02 (D. Mass. 1989). 
96 See Anderson v. Beatrice Foods Co., 862 F.2d 910, 932 (1st Cir. 1988). 
97 See id. 
98 I d. at 924. 
991d. at 925. 
100 ld. 
101 See Anderson, 862 F.2d at 925. 
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was to first determine whether the defendants' nondisclosure had 
been "knowing or deliberate."l02 If deliberate, the plaintiffs were to 
be accorded a presumption that there had been substantial interfer-
ence which Beatrice would have the burden of rebutting by clear and 
convincing evidence.loo 
Given these guidelines, Judge Skinner was to assess the relative 
impact of the Yankee Report and what leads it might have generated 
for the plaintiffs.104 He was instructed to hear from both parties and 
make a decision as to whether lack of access to the report "substan-
tially interfered with plaintiffs' efforts to prepare and present a case 
as to the nexus between the tannery and the pollution of [the Woburn 
wells]."l05 The plaintiffs' opportunity for discovery was to be the cen-
tral issue concerning the tannery, not the sufficiency of their evi-
dence.loo If Judge Skinner found that the defense's withholding of the 
report thwarted plaintiffs' efforts at conducting tannery discovery, he 
could give plaintiffs the chance for further discovery, or grant them a 
new trial on that issue.107 
B. Application of the Court of Appeals Rule 60(b)(3) Standard 
In the first phase of the remand hearings, Judge Skinner found 
"deliberate misconduct" by John Riley because he did not reveal the 
existence of the Yankee Report and certain lab reports and chemical 
formulas during his deposition or at trial, and by Mary Ryan because 
she did not produce the Yankee Report at a deposition. lOB Accordingly, 
Judge Skinner gave the plaintiffs a favorable presumption that there 
had been substantial interference with preparation of their tannery 
case.109 Beatrice faced the burden of rebutting that presumption by 
clear and convincing evidence. no 
In the second phase of the hearings, Beatrice made a request for 
limited discovery regarding plaintiffs' tannery case.lll This resulted in 
plaintiffs identifying their investigative file, which included reorts by 
102 [d. at 925-26. 
103 See id. 
104 See id. at 932. 
106 [d. 
106 See Anderson, 862 F.2d at 932 n.17. 
107 See id. 
lOB Anderson v. Beatrice Foods Co., 127 F.R.D. 1, 5--t) (D. Mass 1989). 
109 See id. at 6. 
liD See id. at 6; see also Anderson, 862 F.2d at 925. 
III See Anderson v. Beatrice Foods Co., 129 F.R.D. 394, 397 (D. Mass 1989). 
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investigators who had conducted pre-trial interviews with individuals 
concerning the tannery.u2 When Judge Skinner asked Schlichtmann 
to see this investigative file, Schlichtmann protested that the file was 
attorney work product and should be kept confidential.113 Judge Skin-
ner explained to Schlichtmann that he would look at the file in cam-
era, and would only use it to confirm that the plaintiffs actually did 
not have groundwater information equivalent to that revealed in the 
Yankee Report.114 If the investigative file indicated that Schlichtmann 
did have information similar to the Yankee Report, then Schlichtmann 
could not argue in good faith that the defendants' failure to produce 
the report substantially interfered with plaintiffs' preparation of their 
tannery case.115 
In his final report on the hearings, Judge Skinner agreed that the 
Yankee Report, "coupled with the opportunity to monitor existing 
test wells at the tannery site during the December, 1985 pump test, 
would have been important to the preparation of a 'tannery case."'l1S 
The report, Judge Skinner found, would have supported plaintiffs' 
experts' theories that there was an aquifer carrying groundwater 
from the tannery to the city wells.117 However, Judge Skinner applied 
the court of appeals' Rule 60(b)(3) standard narrowly, indicating that 
an essential element to plaintiffs' tannery case was whether they 
could show that the tannery had disposed of complaint chemicals 
which had contaminated the tannery site.l1S Since the Yankee Report 
was more probative on the issue of groundwater flow than disposal of 
chemicals, Judge Skinner decided that defendants' withholding of the 
report did not cause substantial interference with plaintiffs' tannery 
case.u9 
In effect, Judge Skinner inappropriately shifted the focus of the 
60(b)(3) inquiry away from the plaintiffs' opportunity for discovery 
regarding their tannery case-and whether the withholding of the 
Yankee Report diminished that opportunity-to whether plaintiffs 
112 See id. at 396-97. 
113 See HARR, supra note 2, at 485; see also Anderson, 129 F.R.D. at 397. 
114 See HARR, supra note 2, at 485. 
116 See id. 
116 Anderson, 129 F.R.D. at 398. Riley had admitted that during the relevant time period the 
tannery used two of the chemicals found in the city wells. See Plaintiffs-Appellants' Petition for 
Rehearing at 13, Anderson v. Beatrice Foods Co., 862 F.2d 910 (1st Cir. 1988) (No. 88-1070) 
[hereinafter Petition]. 
117 See Anderson, 129 F.R.D. at 398. 
118 See id. at 402. 
119 See id. 
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would have been able to win at trial.120 The reason the presumption 
of substantial interference was rebutted, Judge Skinner asserted, 
was because there was no available evidence "tending to prove that 
it [was] more probable than otherwise that the defendant disposed 
of the complaint chemicals at either the tannery site or on the 15 
acres."121 In making this determination, Judge Skinner denied the 
very likely possibility that plaintiffs, armed with the Yankee Report, 
would have "made the tannery a higher-priority item on [their] dis-
covery agenda," and ultimately would have obtained additional evi-
dence "tending to prove" disposal by the tannery.122 
C. Application oJ the Rule 11 Standard 
Judge Skinner held that the plaintiffs did not have evidence of 
disposal of the complaint chemicals on the tannery site at the close of 
their pre-trial investigation and discovery, and that they had violated 
Rule 11 by continuing to prosecute the tannery case.123 In his brief 
explanation of the Rule 11 standard, Judge Skinner indicated that the 
rule required any claims pursued by a party to have an "objective 
basis in fact and law."I24 Although Judge Skinner conceded that more 
latitude should be provided at the beginning of a case for a claim based 
on information and belief rather than knowledge, he stated that the 
"plaintiffs did not have even the benefit of rumor, whisper, or even an 
anonymous tip" regarding their claim that there had been disposal of 
chemicals at the tannery site or the 15 a<ires.l25 Judge Skinner's final 
determination that the defendants' misconduct in deliberately with-
holding evidence was offset by the plaintiffs' Rule 11 violation effec-
tively put an end to Schlichtmann's hopes for obtaining a new trial as 
a result of the defendants' misconduct.126 
1. Impropriety of the Rule 11 Sanction in Light of the Evidence 
Given the information in the plaintiffs' investigative file and evi-
dence gathered during discovery and pursuant to the remand hear-
ings, Judge Skinner's Rule 11 sanction seems to have been inappro-
120 See Brief, supra note 46, at 12. 
121 Anderson, 129 F.R.D. at 401. 
122 See Anderson, 862 F.2d at 932. 
123 See Anderson, 129 F.R.D. at 403-04. 
124 [d. at 403. 
125 [d. at 404 n.5. 
126 See id. at 404. 
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priate. Basing his Rule 11 sanction primarily on Schlichtmann's inves-
tigative file, Judge Skinner stated, "the essential predicate of [plain-
tiffs' tannery case]-use and disposal of the complaint chemicals by 
the defendant-was significantly negated by the evidence developed 
by the plaintiffs themselves in the course of pretrial investigation and 
discovery, and has never been otherwise established."127 Judge Skin-
ner also stated that "[Schlichtmann's] own investigative file contained 
no support whatsoever for the claim of disposal of the complaint 
chemicals .... "128 These assertions overlook, however, a statement in 
plaintiffs' investigative file regarding "Dumping by [the] Riley Tan-
nery."l29 The plaintiffs' investigators indicated that, "as far back as the 
mid-1950s, the tannery disposed of potentially toxic sludge on the 15 
acre site."130 
Further, Judge Skinner referred to the "scores of people, including 
many employees and former employees of the tannery, suppliers of 
chemicals to the tannery and residents and former residents [of the 
area]" that plaintiffs' investigators interviewed who did not know, 
remember, or want to provide information about the tannery's chemi-
cal use or disposal practices to support his charge that "counsel knew 
that there was no available competent evidence" concerning the dis-
posal of chemicals by the defendant.l3l The court neglected, however, 
to point to "numerous witnesses that provided positive information 
and leads concerning the tannery's chemical use and disposal prac-
tices."132 In fact, plaintiffs' pre-trial investigation helped them develop 
• 
1271d. at 402. Judge Skinner explicitly stated that Schlichtmann violated Rule 11 at the "close 
of investigation and discovery." Anderson, 129 F.R.D. at 403. It appears, however, that he 
believed Schlichtmann continued to violate Rule 11 throughout the post-trial proceedings: 
I conclude that even with all of the post-trial revelations, including the tannery labo-
ratory reports and formulae and the expert testimony, both admitted and proffered, 
there is still no available competent evidence tending to prove that it is more probable 
than otherwise that the defendant disposed of the complaint chemicals at either the 
tannery site or on the 15 acres. 
ld. at 401. 
128 ld. at 399. 
129 Petition, supra note 116, at 10 (citing Plaintiffs' Investigative File under seal at 3). 
130 See id. 
131 Anderson, 129 F.R.D. at 399; Petition, supra note 116, at 9. 
132 Petition, supra note 116, at 9. For example, Joe Polino, who worked with the chemist at 
the tannery, indicated to Schlichtmann at one point that the tannery had used one of the 
complaint chemicals for cleaning embossing plates. See HARR, supra note 2, at 186. In addition, 
Schlichtmann found a state public health department report written by sanitary engineer A.C. 
Bolde, who in 1956 observed tannery waste. Bolde wrote, "It was observed that large quantities 
of old sludge containing hair and some fleshings were deposited ... within a few inches of [the 
Aberjona River]." ld. at 187. Likewise, Schlichtmann's investigator spoke to "Ruth Thrner" (a 
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their theory that the tannery had dumped its waste on the side of its 
hill which drained down to the 15 acres-waste that contained high 
levels of the complaint solvents-that plaintiffs' expert had testified 
was tannery waste during the trial. l33 
Additionally, the plaintiffs conducted considerable investigation 
during the misconduct hearings that yielded information relevant to 
the tannery's disposal of chemicals. These proceedings revealed that 
Riley and his attorney had withheld not only the Yankee Report but 
several other documents regarding use of chemicals, groundwater 
flow tests and investigations, and disposal activities that had occurred 
at both the tannery and the 15 acres.134 Judge Skinner would not 
authorize the plaintiffs to examine these documents.135 Also, post-trial 
investigation apparently revealed that contrary to Riley's denials 
before and during the trial, the tannery, during discovery, had possi-
bly conducted waste removal operations at the 15 acres.136 Moreover, 
the First Circuit Court of Appeals found that the suppressed Yankee 
Report showed "two of the complaint chemicals present at the tan-
nery site" and "characterized the data as suggesting that the tannery 
was 'the probable source'" of one of the complaint chemicals.137 Finally, 
Riley admitted during the misconduct hearings that his testimony at 
pseudonym), who said her husband saw "barrels and piles of debris" on the tannery property, 
and had told her about "how sludge waste from the tannery would flow down the hill [from the 
tannery] and onto the [15 acres]." [d. at 188. Turner's son remembered "massive quantities of 
barrels, literally hundreds" on the tannery property. [d. Other witnesses Schlichtmann spoke 
to included a man who played on the 15 acres when he was a boy: "He and his friends used to 
call one area near the tannery Death Valley because of the white, powdery dust coming from 
the tannery that had coated the hillside and killed everything in its path." [d. at 19l. 
133 See id. 
134 See Anderson v. Beatrice Foods Co., 127 F.R.D. 1, 5-.Q (D. Mass. 1989); HARR, supra note 
2, at 480-82; Petition, supra note 116, at 2. Beatrice had admitted that it still had not made a 
complete search of tannery information. "[A]ttorney Ryan admitted 'there were numerous, 
numerous files that were not searched ... there was further testimony about formulas, et 
cetera, documents that were not searched ... I have not searched those to this day.'" Petition, 
supra note 116, at 14 (citing Remand Proceedings 3/14/89 Transcript Volume IV: Day 14II:72-
78). 
135 See HARR, supra note 2, at 481---82. 
136 See Brief, supra note 46, at 19; HARR, supra note 2, at 469-73. Mr. James Granger, the 
tannery's former head of maintenance, stated that there had been a two week secret removal 
operation on the 15 acre site directed by Riley in the summer of 1983 prior to the EPA coming 
onto the property. See HARR, supra note 2, at 472; Brief, supra note 46, at 20. Granger testified 
that later, he discovered "brown sludge" that reminded him of "something that sometimes came 
out of the [tannery's] catch basin." Brief, supra note 46, at 20 (citing Transcript Vol. II 2116/89 
4:76-93). 
137 Anderson v. Beatrice Foods Co., 862 F.2d 910, 931-32 (lst Cir. 1988). See Petition, supra 
note 116, at 13. 
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trial-that the complaint chemicals used by the tannery were totally 
consumed, leaving no waste to be disposed of-was false.13s 
Whether plaintiffs would be able to use the above evidence to win 
a trial on the claim that the tannery contaminated the city wells 
should not have mattered for purposes of a Rule 11 inquiry.139 At the 
very least, the substantial circumstantial evidence plaintiffs had gath-
ered regarding disposal of the complaint chemicals at the tannery 
added up to considerably more than "rumor, whisper, or even an 
anonymous tip."l40 Furthermore, the fact that the plaintiffs had con-
ducted a "thorough and well-documented" pre-filing inquiry into the 
facts and law apparently did not, as it should have, factor positively 
into the court's Rule 11 analysis.14l 
Judge Skinner's sanction under Rule 11 in this case seemed to run 
counter to the case law. The Anderson case presented special circum-
stances that weighed against a stringent application of Rule 11. For 
instance, First Circuit courts had supported the relaxation of the Rule 
11 standard for cases involving claims where plaintiffs' ability to 
obtain necessary documents and materials was made difficult because 
such information was in defendants' exclusive possession.l42 The An-
derson case presented this very situation-the plaintiffs did not have 
138 Riley had testified at trial that during the relevant time period the tannery used two of 
the chemicals found in the city wells. See Petition, supra note 116, at 13; Anderson v. Beatrice 
Foods Co., 129 F.R.D. 394, 399 (D. Mass 1989). These chemicals, he indicated, were "totally 
consumed by combustion," or "recycled." Anderson, 129 F.R.D. at 399. At the remand hearings, 
however, "Riley admitted that the flow-coater machine used by the tannery to apply the 
[chemicals] was an unenclosed system, which dropped the [chemicals] onto the leather like a 
'waterfall' and was operated over floor drains that drained to the sedimentation tank." See Brief, 
supra note 46, at 17 (citing 'Ii-anscript Vol. IV 3/1418914:40-44). Under questioning by Judge 
Skinner, Riley "admitted that his testimony at trial that the tannery had rarely used the 
'flow-coater' machine was not true. The tannery used the machine from the 'middle 1960s' to 
the closure of the plant (12188)." [d. at 17 (citing 'Ii-anscript Vol. IV 3/1418914:42,46-47). See 
also HARR, supra note 2, at 482. 
139 See MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 12, § 11.11[9][a] ("[Rule 11] sanctions should 
not be imposed if there is some evidence tending to support the claim, even if the allegations 
are ultimately disproved."). See also supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text. In fact, it was 
quite possible, given Anderson's procedural history, that the defendants would have won a 
summary judgment motion if the plaintiffs were granted a new trial on the question of whether 
the tannery property alone had contaminated the city wells. See HARR, supra note 2, at 467. 
This is because the court of appeals had affirmed Judge Skinner's ruling that groundwater from 
the 15 acres had not reached the city wells, despite subsequent EPA and U.S. Geological Survey 
findings to the contrary. See id. Such holding would, by res judicata, apply in a new tannery 
trial. See id. Because the 15 acres was between the tannery and the contaminated wells, "a trial 
involving only the tannery would be just a charade, a hopeless exercise." [d. 
140 See Anderson, 129 F.R.D. at 404 n.5. 
141 See supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text. 
142 See supra notes 81-85 and accompanying text. 
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the Yankee Report, the several other documents regarding the tan-
nery's use of chemicals, testing and disposal activities, or access to the 
tannery property during discovery.l43 Also, like his application of the 
Rule 60(b)(3) standard, Judge Skinner reduced his Rule 11 inquiry to 
an unduly narrow frame of reference: the issue of disposal of the 
complaint chemicals.l44 Although it was within the judge's discretion 
to base a Rule 11 sanction on only one issue in the plaintiffs' case,145 
there was precedent implying that in extraordinary toxic tort cases 
involving important public health issues, Rule 11 sanctions should not 
be imposed based on the failure of one link in the causal chain, even 
if such failure means the complaint must be dismissed.146 
14<1 See HARR, supra note 2, at 481--82; Petition, supra note 116, at 14. The determination that 
plaintiffs had violated Rule 11 on the disposal issue was made without the plaintiffs ever being 
granted access to the tannery to test or investigate its condition. See Petition, at 14. The court 
of appeals found that plaintiffs were "refused permission to enter" the tannery property "for 
purposes of testing and investigation" because of Beatrice's "specious argument that Beatrice 
could not grant access to the tannery property because the tannery had been resold to Riley." 
Anderson v. Beatrice Foods Co., 862 F.2d 910, 931 n.16 (1st Cir. 1988); Petition, at 10. 
144 See Anderson, 129 F.R.D. at 403-04. 
145 See, e.g., Paine Webber, Inc. v. Can Am Fin. Group Ltd., 121 F.R.D. 324, 330 (N.D. Ill. 1988) 
("Rule 11 applies to every statement and claim in a paper."). 
146 See In re 'Agent Orange' Prod. Liab. Litig., Lilley v. Dow Chern. Co., 611 F. Supp. 1267, 
1269 (E.D.N.Y. 1985); see also Thomas v. Evans, 880 F.2d 1235, 1242 (5th Cir. 1989) ("Rule 11 
does not apply when one prong of, or argument supporting, a claim is deficient, but other prongs 
or arguments support the pleading or motion."). In Agent Orange, the court found that even 
though the plaintiff might· be able to establish that the defendant chemical companies knew that 
Agent Orange was harmful, and that plaintiff was exposed to Agent Orange in Vietnam, the 
causation leg of the tort claim could not be established based on information that was currently 
available. See Agent Orange, 611 F. Supp. at 1268--ti9. Although the complaint had to be dis-
missed, the importance of the plaintiffs having raised public awareness of the defendants' failure 
to take reasonable precautions weighed against issuance of a Rule 11 sanction. See id. Similarly, 
in Anderson, the plaintiffs had three basic tort issues to prove: 1) that Beatrice disposed of the 
complaint chemicals; 2) that the chemicals traveled to the wells through the groundwater; and 
3) that the chemicals caused plaintiffs' injuries. See Anderson v. Beatrice Foods Co., 862 F.2d 
910, 921 (1st Cir. 1988). Even if the court found that there was not enough evidence to prove 
that Beatrice disposed of the chemicals at the tannery, and that the plaintiffs' case ultimately 
had to be dismissed, it still should not have sanctioned plaintiffs under Rule 11. The trial had 
received "intense public and media attention," and it r3.i.sed for the first time, among other 
things, public awareness of the connection between certain childhood disorders including leuke-
mia and contaminated drinking water. See JAN RICHARD SCHLICHTMANN, PRACTICING LAW 
INSTITUTE, EIGHT FAMILIES SUE W.R.GRACE AND BEATRICE FOODS FOR POISONING CITY 
WELLS WITH SOLVENTS AND CAUSING LEUKEMIA, DISEASE, AND DEATH 220-21 (1987). See 
also HARR, supra note 2, at 285 ("Woburn was attracting attention across the entire nation," 
that the media stated would "make 'the court a forum for a national debate' on toxic waste and 
cancer" and would have "major implications for companies."). By the Agent Orange rationale, 
the fact that the Anderson case implicated public health interests should have weighed against 
the issuance of a Rule 11 sanction based on the ultimate failure of one prong of their claims. 
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2. Rule 11 Sanction Was Unfair, Given the Discovery Misconduct 
The court's Rule 11 sanction also appears to have been unfair, given 
that it had made a finding that the defendants deliberately withheld 
probative evidence.147 If, as the court found, it was Beatrice's obliga-
tion in the first place to give the plaintiffs all available information 
during discovery, it does not seem appropriate for Judge Skinner to 
have sanctioned plaintiffs for a Rule 11 violation when defendants' 
conduct impeded the very investigation that Rule 11 required of 
plaintiffs' counsel.l48 The First Circuit Court of Appeals, in fact, had 
stated that "it seems fair to presume that the suppressed evidence 
would have damaged the nondisclosing party .... It seems equally 
logical that where discovery material is deliberately suppressed, its 
absence can be presumed to have inhibited the unearthing of further 
admissible evidence adverse to the withholder .... "149 Plaintiffs' the-
ory that the tannery was polluted, then, should have become much 
more persuasive, at least for purposes of Rule 11, given Beatrice's 
efforts to conceal evidence.l60 
3. Due Process Considerations 
In Anderson, the First Circuit Court of Appeals did not parse 
through the factual basis for Judge Skinner's Rule 11 sanction to de-
147 See Anderson v. Beatrice Foods Co., 127 F.R.D. 1, 5--6 (D. Mass. 1989). 
148 See Petition, supra note 116, at 8. 
149 See Anderson, 862 F.2d at 925 (citing Nation-Wide Check Corp. v. Forest Hills Distrib., 
Inc., 692 F.2d 214, 217-19 (1st Cir. 1982) ("deliberate nonproduction or destruction of relevant 
document is 'evidence that the party which has prevented production did so out of the well-
founded fear that the contents would harm him"'». This is the so-called "spoliation inference." 
See Charles R. Nesson, Incentives to Spoliate Evidence in Civil Litigation: The Need for 
Vigorous Judicial Action, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 793, 795 n.7 (1991) ("The spoliation inference 
represents a factual inference or a legal presumption that because a litigant destroyed a 
particular piece of evidence, that evidence would have been damaging to the litigant."). 
160 See Plaintiffs' Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 28, Anderson v. Beatrice Foods Co., 862 
F.2d 910 (1st Cir. 1988) (No. 88-1070) [hereinafter Writ]. Curiously, the court did find plaintiffs' 
theory that the tannery site was polluted at least plausible, given that during the misconduct 
hearings Judge Skinner himself ordered discovery on the tannery property. See Anderson v. 
Beatrice Foods Co., 129 F.R.D. 394, 396 (D. Mass. 1989). After Judge Skinner found that 
defendants had deliberately withheld the Yankee Report, he appointed an independent expert 
to determine whether the tannery was contaminated with any of the complaint chemicals. See 
id. at 396. The judge planned to go forward with such testing until it appeared that "alterations 
in the topography of the tannery site since the time of the trial would require the drilling of 
new test wells, which would have taken many months longer and cost much more than had been 
originally suggested." Id. The judge's own decision to test the tannery property for contamina-
tion, based on the same record as plaintiffs, seems inconsistent with his Rule 11 finding that 
plaintiffs had no basis to believe the tannery was contaminated. See Brief, supra note 46, at 22. 
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termine thoroughly whether it was appropriate.161 Instead, the court 
of appeals summarily accepted Judge Skinner's decision, under an 
extremely deferential standard of review.162 Because Judge Skinner 
had recommended the Rule 11 sanction using his inherent powers, it 
is questionable whether the plaintiffs were given notice and opportu-
nity to present arguments before the Rule 11 sanctions were effec-
tively imposed.163 
Although the 1983 version of Rule 11 explicitly permitted judges to 
make findings of Rule 11 violations on their own accord, the rule 
also required that there be notice and opportunity to present argu-
ments before the imposition of sanctions.164 Technically, the court of 
appeals had retained jurisdiction in the misconduct matters, and had 
remanded to Judge Skinner so that he could conduct further hearings 
and report back.166 The court of appeals stated that since the plaintiffs 
were given "ample" notice and opportunity to present arguments to 
the court of appeals before Judge Skinner's "recommendation" for 
sanctions was actually imposed by the court of appeals, there was no 
due process violation.166 It is apparent from the court of appeals' 
opinion, however, that it treated Judge Skinner's Rule 11 sanction 
"recommendation" as if it were a finding, reversible only for an abuse 
of discretion.157 The "heavy burden" required by the court of appeals' 
abuse of discretion standard of review arguably precluded the plain-
tiffs from having a fair opportunity to oppose the Rule 11 sanction, 
since the sanction had already effectively been imposed at the district 
161 See Anderson v. Beatrice Foods Co., 900 F.2d 388, 393-96 (1st Cir. 1990). 
162 See id. The court stated, "Because the imposition of sanctions is peculiarly within the 
province of the court in which the challenged conduct occurs, a party complaining to an appellate 
tribunal in respect to trial-level sanctions 'bears a heavy burden of demonstrating that the trial 
judge was clearly not justified in entering [the] order.'" [d. at 393 (citing Spiller v. U.S.V. Lab., 
Inc. 842 F.2d 535, 537 (1st Cir. 1988». 
Here, our examination of the papers persuades us that the lower court weighed all 
proper and no improper factors in dealing with sanctions. Nor can we conclude, in the 
extraordinary circumstances of this extraordinary litigation, that the court made a 
'serious mistake' in balancing the scales by imposing somewhat unconventional reme-
dial measures on the derelict parties. 
[d. at 394. 
153 See Writ, supra note 150, at 25; see also MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 12, 
§ 11.23[3] ("It is not sufficient to provide a sanctioned party or attorney an opportunity to 
convince the court to set aside sanctions after they have been imposed."). 
164 See FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (1983). See also supra notes 78--80, 90 and accompanying text. 
166 See Anderson, 862 F.2d at 930. See also HARR, supra note 2, at 46fHi7; Blomquist, supra 
note 15, at 974. 
166 See Anderson, 900 F.2d at 396. 
157 See id. at 394; Writ, supra note 150, at 14. 
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court level sua sponte.l58 Giving the plaintiffs an after-the-fact oppor-
tunity to convince the court of appeals to set aside Judge Skinner's 
sanction, under a perfunctory appellate review, did not comply with 
the spirit of Rule 11.159 
VI. THE BIG PICTURE: RULE 11 AND ENVIRONMENTAL 
LITIGATION TODAY 
This Comment has argued that the court's Rule 11 sanction against 
the plaintiffs, given the factual circumstances of the Anderson case, 
was "an unfair turning of the tables."160 It would be somewhat disin-
genuous, however, to consider Anderson to be the paradigmatic envi-
ronmental case,161 or its Rule 11 sanction to be typical in environ-
mental litigation. 162 On the other hand, because the Anderson case has 
generated and will probably continue to generate widespread public 
attention, it is important to glean some lessons from the Rule 11 
sanction in Anderson for the benefit of future courts and plaintiffs 
involved in environmental lawsuits. First, however, it is necessary to 
explore briefly the ways in which Rule 11 has changed since Ander-
son. 
158 See id. 
159 See supra notes 78-80, 90 and accompanying text. 
160 See Blomquist, supra note 15, at 975. 
161 The court of appeals, for instance, appropriately described the Anderson case as "long, 
complicated, [and] factbound," "a labyrinthine puzzle," "convoluted," and having a "checkered 
history." See Anderson v. Beatrice Foods Co., 900 F.2d 388, 392, 396 (lst Cir. 1990). 
162 In fact, Professor Carl Tobias has indicated that Rule 11 "seem[s] to be presenting rela-
tively few complications for environmental plaintiffs and environmental lawyers." See Carl 
Tobias, An Update on Pleadings and Sanctions in Environmental Cases, 26 ENVTL. L. 449, 
451 (1996). See also Tobias, Environmental Litigation and Rule 11, supra note 59, at 434--40. 
Professor Tobias investigated Rule 11 cases that were reported or were on-line, and requested 
that environmental plaintiffs who had informal experience with Rule 11 contact him. See Tobias, 
Update, at 449. In 1993, he reported that no plaintiffs had contacted him to express concerns 
that Rule 11 had disadvantaged them. See id. Tobias suggests that the silence of attorneys 
regarding informal Rule 11 activity may be indicative of the lack of adverse informal Rule 11 
activity, but he also acknowledges the difficulty of making "defensible conclusions" regarding 
Rule 11 when it is invoked in an informal setting. See Tobias, Update, supra at 449; Tobias, 
Environmental Litigation and Rule 11, supra note 59, at 445. Accordingly, although Tobias did 
speak to more than twenty-five attorneys who had not been disadvantaged by Rule 11 in 
environmental litigation, it is entirely possible that there are environmental attorneys and 
plaintiffs, not part of his study, who have been disadvantaged by informal threats of Rule 11 
sanctions. See Tobias, Environmental Litigation and Rule 11, at 445--46. 
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A. The 1993 Version of Rule 11 
The 1993 amendments have changed Rule 11 in a way that is on the 
whole likely to decrease the chances that judges will use it to the 
disadvantage of environmental plaintiffs, as was the case in Ander-
son.l63 While these amendments do not ensure less variation and more 
predictability in courts' Rule 11 inquiries, they do provide a better 
basis than was possible under the 1983 rule for courts to conduct 
a structured analysis of potentially frivolous claims.l64 First, the Ad-
visory Committee redrafted the threshold requirements that define 
the legal and factual merits of a case.l65 Rule 11 now refers to the 
factual aspects of a claim more distinctly than before, linking the 
court's assessment of the factual merits of the claim to specific evi-
dentiary standards and summary judgment procedures.l66 Also, the 
1993 amendments to Rule 11 require judges who order sanctions to 
make findings. 167 A judge's findings "must describe the conduct that 
violates the rule and why sanctions were ordered."I68 Further, the 
Committee's note makes it plain that Rule 11 is directed toward only 
significant breaches of a party's conduct, and that the liberal uses to 
which the rule had previously been put should end.169 Perhaps most 
importantly for environmental cases, the amendments to the rule 
focus the sanctions inquiry on the adequacy of a party's pre-filing 
investigation, as opposed to assessing the merits of a party's claim.170 
If courts apply the pre-filing investigation requirement as the Com-
mittee intended, "a claim that is problematic from a legal or eviden-
tiary perspective would not be deemed frivolous so long as the inves-
tigation passed muster."l7l . 
163 See Carl Tobias, Pleadings and Sanctians in Environmental Cases, 24 ENVTL. L. 317, 319 
(1994). 
164 See Armour, supra note 56, at 766. 
166 See Armour, supra note 56, at 765 (citing FED. R. elV. P. 11(b)(1}-(4». 
166 See Armour, supra note 56, at 765-66. 
167 See FED. R. elV. P. 11(c)(3) and advisory committee's note. 
166 Armour, supra note 56, at 704 (citing FED. R. elV. P. 11(c)(3». 
169 See Armour, supra note 56, at 747-48 (citing FED. R. elV. P. 11 advisory committee's note 
(1993». 
170 See Armour, supra note 56, at 766 (citing William W. Schwarzer, Rule 11 Revisited, 101 
HARV. L. REV. 1013, 1021-23 (1988». This emphasis on the investigative responsibilities of a 
party would provide more protection to environmental plaintiffs, who, like the plaintiffs in 
Anderson, conduct a thorough pre-filing investigation, but often lack information solely in the 
defendants' possession that would affect the merits of the claim. 
171 Armour, supra note 56, at 768. 
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The amendments to Rule 11 significantly reduce the likelihood that 
sanctions will be imposed.172 One reason is that the mandatory "shall" 
language defining courts' duty to sanction in the 1983 version was 
replaced by permissive language.173 This revision gives judges "virtu-
ally unlimited discretion to withhold sanctions," even if they find 
violations.174 Also, the amendments include a "safe harbor" provision 
that gives parties twenty-one days in which to strike or change ques-
tionable legal papers if they have allegedly violated the rule.175 
Commentators have warned, however, that the 1993 amendments 
did not alter an elemental aspect of the rule-the allocation of discre-
tion to the district courts to administer Rule 1V76 It is apparent that 
"the Committee viewed the problems of indeterminacy, variability, 
inconsistency, and lack of predictability in the [1983 Rule 11] as es-
sentially unsolvable from a drafting perspective."177 Notwithstanding 
the Committee's attempts to create a more structured analysis and 
place more emphasis on attorneys' conduct in courts' sanctions inquir-
ies, "nothing in the amended rule prohibits courts from treating as a 
predicate to sanctions the factual or legal merits of a claim standing 
alone."178 Even with its amendments, then, Rule 11 could still present 
problems to environmental plaintiffs because courts maintain the dis-
172 See Tobias, Pleadings and Sanctions, supra note 163, at 319. 
173 See FED. R. CIV. P. 11; see also Armour, supra note 56, at 772. 
174 See Armour, supra note 56, at 772. 
175 See FED. R. Crv. P. 11(c)(1)(A); see also Tobias, Pleadings and Sanctions, supra note 163, 
at 319. 
176 See FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee's note (1993) ("Whether a violation has occurred 
and what sanctions, if any, to impose for a violation are matters committed to the discretion of 
the trial court."). See also Armour, supra note 56, at 764; Tobias, The 1993 Revision of Federal 
Rule 11, 70 IND. L. J. 171, 196 (1994) (indicating that judicial discretion is still a significant 
element in Rule 11). Some commentators have suggested that the new Rule 11 provides for 
even greater judicial discretion. See Howard A. Cutler, A Practitioner's Guide to the 1993 
Amendment to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, 67 TEMP. L. REV. 265, 267 (1994) ("By 
providing greater discretion to district court judges, the new rule will promote inequitable 
decisions."). 
177 Armour, supra note 56, at 764 (citing Advisory Committee on the Civil Rules, Judicial 
Conference of the U.S., Call for Written Comments on Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure and Related Rules, as Amended in 19836-7 (July 24, 1990)). 
[d. 
Can the indeterminacy of the rule be diminished? The Committee would welcome 
suggestions to make the sanctions rules more explicit in order to enable the judges to 
be more predictable and even handed in their application if this can be done without 
causing other perhaps more arbitrary results. At the same time, the Committee is 
aware of its own inherent limitations; efforts to be more explicit than the subject of 
the rule will admit are likely to be counterproductive. 
178 Armour, supra note 56, at 769 (citing Carl Tobias, The 1993 Revision of Federal Rule 11, 
70 IND. L. J. 171, 195-96 (1994)). 
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cretion to apply it stringently, or place undue emphasis on the merits, 
rather than the adequacy of the pre-filing inquiry.I79 
Furthermore, the 1990 Supreme Court case Cooter & Gell v. Han-
marx Corp. provides the foundation for the Advisory Committee's 
note to the 1993 Rule 11 amendments. ISO Strict adherence to Cooter 
could have harmful consequences for environmental plaintiffs. lSI In 
that case, the Court set forth the very deferential abuse of discretion 
standard of appellate review for trial court Rule 11 determinations.I82 
As it did in Anderson, use of this standard will make it more difficult 
for environmental plaintiffs to succeed in having appellate courts 
reverse findings of Rule 11 violations. I83 
B. Recommendations 
Although the Rule 11 sanction in Anderson should not necessarily 
be considered independently of the "checkered" procedural history of 
that case,I84 there are general principles that can be culled from An-
derson regarding the application of Rule 11 to environmentallitiga-
tion. First, there are several contextual elements of typical environ-
mental lawsuits that weigh in favor of curtailed enforcement of Rule 
11 by courts hearing such cases.I86 Environmental lawsuits are usually 
179 It does not appear, for example, that any provision in the 1993 version of Rule 11 would 
have prohibited Judge Skinner from recommending the Rule 11 sanction in Anderson, if the 
1993 rule was operative at the time. The twenty-one day safe harbor would not have applied, 
since the judge made the sanction recommendation using his inherent powers. See FED. R. CIV. 
P. 11 (c)(1)(B); MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 12, § 11.22[1][b]. 
180 See FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee's note (citing Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 
496 U.S. 384 (1990»; Armour, supra note 56, at 730. 
181 See Tobias, Environmental Litigation and Rule 11, supra note 59, at 443. 
182 See Cooter, 496 U.S. at 401. 
183 See Tobias, Environmental Litigation and Rule 11, supra note 59, at 443. Some commen-
tators have criticized this deferential standard, and argued that there should be "a more flexible 
appellate approach ... that provides an appropriate level of review depending on the nature of 
the decisionmaking involved in the issue raised on appeal." Armour, supra note 56, at 705 (citing 
Martin B. Louis, Discretion of Law: Appellate Review of Determinations that Rule 11 Has Been 
Violated or that Nonmutual Issue Preclusion Will Be Imposed Offensively, 68 N.C.L. REV. 733, 
760 (1990». 
184 At least one commentator has indicated that the Rule 11 sanction in Anderson may have 
been "really based on wanting to get rid of a nettlesome case and to, simultaneously, discourage 
large, complex cases which have the potential for tying up judicial resources for years at a time." 
Blomquist, supra note 15, at 976. See also HARR, supra note 2, at 467 ("To Schlichtmann, it was 
apparent that the appeals court wanted to clean up the allegations of malfeasance [against the 
defendants] without in any way disturbing the verdict."). Counterbalancing these allegations 
with a Rule 11 sanction against the plaintiffs did just that. 
185 Rule 11 permits courts to adjust their level of scrutiny according to the context of the 
particular lawsuit. See MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 12, § 11.11[3]. Although the 
1993 Rule 11 requires an objective standard of conduct for attorneys and litigants, "su~jective 
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inordinately expensive,l86 and there are often substantial financial 
disparities between environmental plaintiffs and defendants. 187 If an 
environmental plaintiff has limited resources, that plaintiff may not 
be able to retain the appropriate experts, gather the necessary com-
plex environmental information about a prospective defendant, or 
obtain direct evidence of health effects having been caused by par-
ticular environmental exposures.188 Such plaintiff may thus appear to 
contravene Rule l1's requirements regarding pre-filing factual inves-
tigations.189 Also, it may be difficult for an environmental plaintiff to 
obtain soil or groundwater samples or other relevant information 
from the private property of a prospective defendant. l90 The imposi-
tion of sanctions for Rule 11 in such cases, or the threat of having to 
spend money on satellite Rule 11 litigation, runs the risk of discour-
aging environmental plaintiffs and their counsel from bringing or 
enthusiastically pursuing meritorious lawsuits that would ultimately 
protect the environment or address public health concerns.191 
Also, judges should recognize that environmental litigation typi-
cally involves complex issues of law and fact that can present serious 
obstacles to plaintiffs.192 This area of law is relatively new and in a 
factors may be considered, since 'Rule 11 sanctions are based on an objective standard of 
reasonableness under the circumstances.'" [d.; see also supra notes 67-88 and accompanying 
text. 
186 See Robert F. Blomquist, Emerging Themes and Dilemmas in American Toxic Tort Law 
1988-91: A Legal-Historical and Philosophical Exegesis, 18 S. ILL. U. L. J. 1, 100-01 (1993). 
187 See Thbias, Environmental Litigation and Rule 11, supra note 59, at 439. In Anderson, 
although the plaintiffs spent nearly $2 million on the case, they were significantly outspent by 
the defendants, whom together spent more than $7 million. See HARR, supra note 2, at 454-55. 
One does not need too active an imagination to liken the parties in Anderson to the proverbial 
"litigating David matched against a defending Goliath." See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying 
text. See also HARR, supra note 2, at 463 (indicating that the expense of the trial eventually 
caused Schlichtmann to become homeless). 
188 See Tobias, Environmental Litigation and Rule 11, supra note 59, at 444; Blomquist, 
Emerging Themes, supra note 186, at 43. In Anderson, for example, the plaintiffs retained 
expensive medical experts in several different disciplines: "neurology, cardiology, toxicology, 
internal medicine, among others." HARR, supra note 2, at 141 ("if nothing else, it was by now 
perfectly clear that Woburn would require a true fortune to prepare"). [d. Likewise, the 
plaintiffs' environmental consultants were costly. See HARR, supra note 2, at 349 (indicating 
that "Western Geophysical, the environmental consulting company that had drilled forty moni-
toring wells in Woburn and performed seismic refraction tests and soil and groundwater analy-
sis" generated a $598,483.76 bill). 
189 See Tobias, Environmental Litigation and Rule 11, supra note 59, at 444. 
190 See id. at 444. This was the case in Anderson. See supra notes 142-43 and accompanying 
text. 
191 See id. at 439, 442-43, 483-84. 
192 See id. at 436; see also Blomquist, Emerging Themes, supra note 186, at 42-43. Professor 
Blomquist describes several difficulties inherent in toxic tort lawsuits, including the problems 
of precisely measuring the routes and amounts of exposure to toxins, the long latency periods 
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state of perpetual change, primarily because of the "massive, convo-
luted statutory schemes that underlie many environmental suits" and 
the lack of scientific certainty present in theories of causation and 
liability.193 A strict application of Rule 11 in this context may make 
attorneys "so paranoid that they cling to precedent and plead tradi-
tional theories, thereby discouraging innovation in an otherwise dy-
namic area of environmentallaw."194 
Finally, courts must realize that Rule 11 has no place in environ-
mental litigation, or for that matter, any litigation, where the adverse 
party has spoliated evidence. If courts follow the lead of Anderson in 
this regard, parties engaged in similar complex toxic tort lawsuits 
may have an incentive to suppress evidence, or at least enough of one 
to enable them to obtain offsetting sanctions.195 In such cases, the 
more a party tampers with or withholds evidence, the less evidence 
is accessible to the victim to prove the claim or support its pursuit,196 
Contrary to the principles set forth by the Advisory Committee, 
following Anderson in this regard would chill the enthusiasm of envi-
ronmental plaintiffs who think they may have been victims of evi-
dence spoliation to maintain claims that may have been affected by 
the wrongdoing.197 To pursue such claims could result, as it did in 
Anderson, in a finding that they contravened Rule 11.198 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The Rule 11 sanction issued against the plaintiffs in the Anderson 
case was inappropriate under the circumstances. Plaintiffs had con-
ducted comprehensive investigations before trial and throughout the 
between toxic exposure and resulting injury, the inability to isolate the particular disease or 
ailment with the claimed toxic exposure, deficient toxicological data, limited technology capable 
of quantifying causation between toxins and diseases, and the high costs of gathering informa-
tion and expertise. See id. See also HARR, supra note 2, at 269 ("The [Anderson] trial, wrote 
Facher, would be 'the single most complex medical and scientific case ever tried by any counsel 
in this case."'). 
193 See Tobias, Environmental Litigation and Rule 11, supra note 59, at 436; see also David 
Sive et al., Environmental Litigation and the Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, Effective December 31,1993, SA85 ALI-ABA 169, 176 (1996). Rule l1's reference to 
nonfrivolous argument for modification or reversal of old law or for the establishment of new 
law "is of particular importance in environmental cases, because of the relative newness of the 
field." Sive, at 176. 
194 See Tobias, Environmental Litigation and Rule 11, supra note 59, at 483-84. 
195 See Petition, supra note 116, at 12. 
196 See id. 
197 See id. 
198 See id. 
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post-trial remand that, at the very least, revealed substantial circum-
stantial evidence of the tannery's disposal of complaint chemicals. 
More importantly, defendants thwarted the very investigation that 
Rule 11 mandates, by deliberately withholding probative evidence. 
Future courts should not follow the Anderson court's example in its 
stringent application of Rule 11 to a complex environmental lawsuit. 
Although environmental plaintiffs should not be immune from Rule 
11, the difficulties inherent in prosecuting an environmental lawsuit, 
such as resource disparities among the parties, the inability to obtain 
adequate discovery, and the complexity and relative newness of the 
field, indicate that courts should seriously consider curtailed enforce-
ment of Rule 11 in complicated environmental cases. Disposition on 
the merits is generally preferable, particularly where the environ-
mental claims, like those in the Anderson case, raise important ques-
tions of public policy and individual rights. 
